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Furman abolished the way the death penalty was administered in previous years, Furman was responsible for ushering in what some death penalty experts would refer to as the modern period of the death penalty. 20   In Furman, William Henry Furman was sentenced to death for murder during the commission of a felony. On a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,                                                         17 Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) 18 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 19 Ballentines Law Dictionary (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 3rd ed. 2010) 20 Robert M. Bohm, Deathquest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital 




                                                        21 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, (1972) 22 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) 
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addition of a bifurcated trial is presumably one of the most notable requirements for a constitutional death penalty trial. A bifurcated trial in death penalty cases refers to having death penalty cases separated into two separate and independent phases. The first phase is a guilt or innocence phase, in which the jury decides if the respondent is guilty or innocent. The second phase is a sentencing phase in which the decision of the punishment is made by the judge with recommendation from the jury or in some circumstances by the jury. In the second phase, aggravating and mitigating circumstances are weighed to decide if the guilty person should receive death or a lighter sentence, such as life without opportunity of parole. Furthermore, Gregg provided for new safeguards to ensure that arbitrariness did not play a factor in sentencing. In determining if arbitrariness was a factor in sentencing, the court must determine    “1. Whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and 2. Whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and 3. Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant.”23  The questions of arbitrariness are questions that the Georgia Supreme Court had to answer on direct review. With these reforms, the Supreme Court found Georgia’s new death penalty statute did not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg became one of                                                         





















  In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court ruled in Panetti’s favor. They concluded that executing Panetti in his mental condition was a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. The court ruled that the determination of competency cannot be left to the sole discretion of a judge with the help of mental health experts and that a condemned inmate has the right to cross‐examine such claims. The decision of Panetti also had a more far‐reaching effect on the execution procedures of the mentally ill: Panetti also expanded the definition of incompetency. As stated by Dr. Bohm, “The court held that it is not enough to consider only whether the death row inmate is aware that he is going to be executed and why, without considering delusions that may prevent him from comprehending the meaning of the punishment.”39   Panetti, who believed his execution was a conspiracy, would be found incompetent under this new expanded definition because his delusions prevented him from having a rational understanding of his punishment. Today Panetti remains one of the strongest challenges to the execution of legally incompetent inmates. Pannetti reaffirmed the provisions in Ford establishing the definition of incompetency to “an ultimately legal and not solely medical determination.”40   Both Ford and Panetti have established the legal foundation for barring the execution of legally incompetent inmates. As a result of these two cases, an inmate cannot be executed if he or she cannot understand that his or her execution is imminent and it will                                                         39 Robert M. Bohm, Deathquest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital 
Punishment in the United States, 89 (Anderson, 4th ed. 2012). 40 Peggy M. Tobolowsky, To Panetti and Beyond - Defining and Identifying Capital Offenders 

























                                                        53 Dora W. Klein, Curiouser and Curiouser: Involuntary Medications and Incompetent Criminal 
Defendants After Sell V. United States, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 897, (2005)  54 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) 
55 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) 56 Dora W. Klein, Curiouser and Curiouser: Involuntary Medications and Incompetent Criminal 




















   As stated in the Supreme Court case Furman, the death penalty is “unique.”58 It is unlike any other punishment in the law with respect to its “finality and enormity.”59 As a result, the death penalty must be afforded specific considerations when functioning with other aspects of the law. With this taken into consideration, a practice of the law that is constitutional in normal circumstances might be interpreted as unconstitutional in death penalty cases.    Forced medication regimens are an example of a constitutional government practice that might have different implications when applied to inmates facing capital punishment. As stated in Ford, inmates may be found competent to be executed if the inmates are aware of the “punishment they are about to suffer” and “why.”60 In addition, inmates can have their competency restored by an involuntary medication regimen. However, the implications of these two issues can become clouded when they are used in the same case. The instance where involuntary medication regimens are used on a condemned inmate has been referred to as the “medicate to execute scheme.”61    At the heart of the “medicate to execute scheme” are two fundamental questions: 
                                                        58 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 59 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 60 Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) 61 Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d (8th District 2003)  (review of whether  forced medications restores competency in accordance to Ford), cert denied, 540 U.S. 832 (2003). 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 The first question asks, “Does the medication actually cure the inmate of his or her illness instead of just masking the symptoms?”    The second question asks “Is the medication is in the inmate’s best medical interest if it allows him or her to be executed?” Neither of these questions have been addressed by the Supreme Court, thus allowing the “medicate to execute scheme” to be an aspect of the American penal system.    There is much disagreement among experts about whether antipsychotic medication does indeed achieve its intended purpose. Many experts claim that there have been significant strides on the area of antipsychotic medications, resulting in the curing of mental illness. Other experts feel that such medications sedate instead of cure the inmate. Since the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of the mentally incompetent, the constitutionality of forced medication regimens depends on whether the medication does, in fact, cure the mentally ill inmate of his or her symptoms. If the medications are not found to cure patients, then the Eighth Amendment is clearly being violated by the “medicate to execute scheme.”   Proponents of the use of medication attest to its ability to cure patients of their symptoms. Many believe that better medications allow for better care. As stated by Douglas Mossman, M.D., an expert on forced medication regimens, “[m]ost patients who take antipsychotic drugs need no longer endure chemical straitjacketing to get relief from their 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delusions, hallucinations and disordered thinking”62 The “chemical straightjacket” refers to the effect some medications have of sedating patients to mask the severity of their symptoms of mental illness. Yet Mossman, a strong advocate of the utilities of antipsychotic medications, attests to antipsychotic medication’s ability to grant patients relief from their delusions.63   On the other hand, opponents of medication’s reliability and effectiveness strongly believe that medications do not grant relief from the symptoms of mental illness. Many believe that antipsychotic medications “merely mask symptoms and do not provide a cure.”64 As a result, an inmate on these medications cannot achieve Ford competency.  The use of these medications creates a risk that the resulting return to competency is only “artificial” and that that an inmate “is no more competent than before the administration of the treatment.”65    It is argued that antipsychotic drugs have a sedation effect that frequently interferes with “the ability to think” and can result in a “clouding of consciousness, and impairment of judgment.”66 Such side effects could result in the inmate’s appearance of competence when, in reality, the inmate is just sedated to the point where his or her                                                         62 Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the Chemical Straitjacket: The Legal Significance of Recent 
Advances in the Pharmaceutical Treatment of Psychosis, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1033, (2002) 63 Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the Chemical Straitjacket: The Legal Significance of Recent 







                                                        67 State of Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La Supreme Crt. 1992) forcefully medicating 









inmate may be involuntarily medicated once an execution date is set if permitted by the jurisdiction of the deciding court. Several courts, such as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Singleton, have allowed the practice of medicating inmates to restore their competency to be executed. Many courts have taken an active role in abolishing the practice.   Louisiana v. Perry is a strong example of a court using its judicial authority to abolish the practice of medicate to execute schemes.73 In Perry, the petitioner Michael Owen Perry, who suffered from a long history of schizophrenia, was on trial for murdering five of his family members in a criminal episode. Schizophrenia is “ a mental disorder, not necessarily an impairment of intelligence, characterized by hallucinations, indifference, and delusions of omnipotence and persecution.”74 While on trial, Perry was placed on a forced medication regimen and found competent to stand trial. He, against the advice of his counsel, withdrew his plea of insanity and instead pleaded not guilty.  In 1985, Perry was convicted of five counts of first‐degree murder and sentenced to death. In response, Perry appealed his death sentence to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, but ordered that his competency be evaluated. Perry was transferred to a state facility where it was determined that he suffered from incurable schizophrenia that “causes his days to be a series of hallucinations, delusional and disordered thinking, incoherent speech, and manic behavior.”75 The mental health                                                         73  State of Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La Supreme Crt. 1992) forcefully medicating condemned inmates) rev’d 584 So.2d 1145 (1991) 74 Ballentines Law Dictionary (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 3rd ed. 2010) 75 State of Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La Supreme Crt. 1992) forcefully medicating 





treatment.”77 Thus, placing an inmate on a forced medication regimen cannot be in the patient’s best medical interest.    Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court looked at the Hippocratic Oath to determine if doctors are permitted to place a condemned inmate on a forced medication regimen. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that, “because the physician is required by his oath to alleviate suffering and do no harm, the state’s order forces him to act unethically.”78 Also, the court found that such a regimen, because of its degrading nature, can be “analogous to torture.”79 To that end, the court ruled that “[w]hen antipsychotic drugs are forcibly administered to further the state's interest in carrying out capital punishment, and therefore not done in the prisoner's best medical interest, the intrusion represents an extremely severe interference with that person's liberty.”80 The Louisiana Supreme Court, in addition, found that the state lacked a compelling state interest to medicate Perry against his will. Medicating a person to meet competency for execution is not a compelling interest for the state and therefore does not allow the state to strip someone of his or her rights for such a cause. The Louisiana Supreme Court also ruled that medicate to execute schemes violate the right to privacy as established in the Louisiana State Constitution. The Louisiana State Constitution reads, “Every person shall be secure in                                                         77 State of Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La Supreme Crt. 1992) forcefully medicating 
condemned inmates) rev’d 584 So.2d 1145 (1991) 78 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 Medicate to execute schemes also have the possibility of violating one’s Sixth Amendment rights. According to Elizabeth G. Schultz, this can happen in a variety of ways.90 One way is that forced medication regimens may interfere with a defendant’s right to present a defense. Many of the medications used in involuntary medication regimens have a sedation effect.91 Such a sedation effect may affect the defendant’s ability to help his counsel present an accurate defense. In addition, Schultz argues that these medication regimens can cause prejudice against a defendant. The effects of some antipsychotic medications can make the patient unable to communicate and act naturally. These unnatural actions may prejudice juries and violate the Sixth Amendment. These forced medication regimens also interfere with the defendant’s right to testify in his or her own words. Side effects of antipsychotic medications may also impair an inmate’s memory, making it difficult for him or her to assist in his or her defense. Such a side affect has a strong potential to violate an inmate’s rights under the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixth Amendments.   In addition to the Fifth, Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, medicate to execute schemes have the potential to violate the Eighth Amendment as well. As stated in Justice Marshall’s opinion in Ford, the Eighth Amendment “prohibits the State form inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”92 The Supreme Court addressed this issue with the need to establish competency, but the test for competency is “ambiguous” in                                                         90 Elizabeth G. Schultz. Sell-ing Your Soul to the Courts: Forced Medication to Achieve Trial 

















                                                        101 Jennifer E. Lloyd, Primum Non Nocere: Singleton v. Norris and the Ethical Dilemma of 
Medicating the Condemned, 58 Ark L. Rev. 225, (2005)  102 Richard A. Spector, Article: Managed Health Care Liability Issues, 32 Cumb. L. Rev. 311 (2002) 103 Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS  (March 27, 2001) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic‐oath‐today.html 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prohibit the participation of physicians in the infliction of capital punishment.”104 By swearing to “never harm anyone” physicians are arguably barred from directly participating in executions. As a result, physicians have an ethical responsibility to refrain from any participation in an execution.    As a supplement to the Hippocratic oath, the AMA provides more specific guidelines for a physician’s participation in an execution. The AMA is an organization of doctors and medical students whose purpose is to further the interests of physicians and their patients, as well as to lobby for legislation helpful to the practice of medicine. While doctors rely on the state for licensure to practice medicine, the AMA has tremendous effects on the way physicians practice medicine because of the active role the AMA takes in promoting physicians’ interests. Doctors must comply with the rules of their state departments of health because these state departments have the ultimate authority to revoke or suspend a physician’s license. Despite this, many physicians abide by the recommendations of the AMA because it creates a standard that many doctors follow.    The AMA openly opposes doctors participating in executions. The AMA code of ethics specifically discusses executions and has dedicated a section to the issue. The code states “[a]ny physician participation in execution is banned.”105 Unlike the Hippocratic oath, which has been interpreted to ban physician participation in executions, the AMA, in clear language, bans physician participation in executions. Armed with this, the AMA goes into great detail to define an execution. According to the AMA an execution is defined as,  
                                                        104 Markus Dirk Dubber, Article: The Pain of Punishment, 44 Buffalo L. Rev. 545 (1996) 105 American Medical Association Code of Ethics, Capital Punishment Opinion 2.06 (June 1994) 
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 “[1.] An action that would directly result in the death of the condemned, [2.] An action which would assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of another individual to directly cause the death of the condemned, [3.] An action that would automatically cause an execution to be carried out on a condemned prisoner”106    This definition is strict, preventing physicians from helping conduct an execution in almost all possible ways. Most notable is the section that bans physicians from participating in “an action which would assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of another individual to directly cause death.”107 As a result, physicians are ethically excluded from even helping select veins to insert needles for lethal injection.    The AMA goes further to describe what constitutes physician participation. According to the AMA, physician participation,  “includes, but is not limited to, the following actions: prescribing or administering tranquilizers and other psychotropic agents and medications that are part of the execution procedure; monitoring vital signs on site or remotely (including monitoring electrocardiograms); attending or 
                                                        106 American Medical Association Code of Ethics, Capital Punishment Opinion 2.06 (June 1994) 107 American Medical Association Code of Ethics, Capital Punishment Opinion 2.06 (June 1994) 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observing an execution as a physician; and rendering of technical advice regarding execution.”108    In opinion 2.06, the AMA outlines practices that would be considered participation and also provides for other actions to be included. Thus, the AMA establishes an ethical consideration that prohibits physicians from participating in an execution. However, this section of the AMA does not define whether placing a patient on a forced medication regiment constitutes physician participation in an execution.    Like executions, the AMA details the provisions for physicians participating in forced medication regimens in its code of ethics. AMA opinion 2.065: Court‐initiated Medical Treatments in Criminal Cases describes provisions for when it is ethical for a physician to prescribe a forced medication regimen. According to the AMA, “[p]hysicians can ethically participate in court‐initiated medical treatments only if the procedure being mandated is therapeutically efficacious and is therefore undoubtedly not a form of punishment or solely a mechanism of social control.”109 Opinion 2.065 requires that the treatment be used to better the patient’s medical condition and not be used as method to restore the patient’s competency for execution. The AMA forbids the use of a medication regimen as a “mechanism of social control.” A physician thus violates his or her ethical duty to participate in an involuntary medication regimen when the patient’s medical condition is not the sole purpose of the treatment.  
                                                        108 American Medical Association Code of Ethics, Capital Punishment Opinion 2.06 (June 1994) 109 American Medical Association Code of Ethics, Court-initiated Medical Treatments in 
Criminal Cases Opinion 2.065 (June 1998) 
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 The AMA, in addition, addresses the ethical responsibilities of physicians during the connection of involuntary medication regimens and capital punishment. In Opinion 2.06 of the AMA code of ethics, the ethical responsibilities of physicians participating in medicate to execute schemes are addressed: “When a condemned prisoner has been declared incompetent to be executed, physicians should not treat the prisoner for the purpose of restoring competence unless a commutation order is issued before treatment begins.”110 If such a guideline is followed, then the execution of an inmate who is artificially competent should never occur because physicians have an ethical responsibility to refrain from doing so. Yet, this is not always the case, as can be seen with the execution of Charles Singleton.    Additionally, there is a question of whether a forced medication regimen can be seen as a direct participation in an execution. If so, then a physician involved in such an act violates opinion 2.06 of the AMA code of ethics that prohibits physicians from participating in executions. According to Douglass Mossman, M.D. , “Some commentators suggest that the physician can be directly responsible for an inmate’s death” when the physician places the patient on an involuntary medication regimen that ultimately restores the inmate’s competency for execution.111 Unfortunately, as seen in many scenarios, “[p]rotocol assigns physician or nurse an essential role in the actual execution.”112 With this said, can a state permit a practice that causes a physician to violate his or her ethical obligation? 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